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AN INFILTRATION GAME WITH 
TIME DEPENDENT PAYOFF 
Marlin U. Thomas and Yair Nisgav* 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
ABSTRACT 
The problem of assigning patrol boats. subject to resource constraints, to capture or 
delay an infiltrator with perishable contraband attempting escape across a long, narrow 
strait is formulated as a two-sided time sequential game. Optimal mixed strategies are 
derived for the situation of one patrol boat against one smuggler. Procedures for obtaining 
numerical solutions for R > 1 patrol boats are discussed. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper describes an application of game theory for examining strategies available to a patrol 
unit pursuing smugglers of perishable items who attempt escape by crossing a long, narrow strait. 
A number of applications of game theory to military-type problems have been reported. Recently, 
Moglewer and Payne [2] discussed an application of two-sided games in examining logistics allocation 
decisions in a combat setting. Charnes and Schroeder [l] have developed some models of tactical 
situations in Antisubmarine Warfare. More recently, Pugh [5] has discussed some time-sequential 
two person zero sum games for treating strategic and tactical decisions within a given time frame. 
For the application described here, we formulate a twosided time-sequential game where one side, 
the patrol unit, has limited resources to catch his opponent, an infiltrator, who must make his escape 
within a fixed time period. 
2. A PATROL GAME. 
We consider a long, narrow strait where smuggling activity is taking place. Let side A represent 
a patrol unit whose objective is to capture or reduce the value of contraband held by side B, the infiltra- 
tor or smuggler seeking escape by crossing the strait to exit from side A’s territory. The contraband 
held by side B is perishable with a lifetime of M time units; consequently, he must make his escape 
within M time units in order to benefit from his infiltration. An example of the type of contraband is 
intelligence information. Side A is under a single command equipped with speedboats containing 
search radar and communication units. Side B is an individual unit with small motorboats. Although 
side A has search radar, due to the narrowness of the strait, side B’s radar echo will be shadowed 
by land, thus making radar detection near the shore virtually impossible. Thus, A can detect B only 
if B is sufficiently far from shore. For obvious reasons, side B only attempts escape at night, and he 
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A 
departs from a point near a village or parallel to a village located on the other side of the strait. Al- 
though the patrol boats are much faster than B’s, the fact that the strait is long and narrow gives side 
B a chance to cross successfully without being detected. 
Viewed as a game, both sides would like to use their “best” strategies. The best strategy for A is 
that which maximizes the number of boats captured from side B. Side B views his best strategy as the 
one maximizing the number of trips per boat before capture. We make the following further simpli- 
fying assumptions. 
Assumptions : 
1. Detection information for sideA is perfect in the sense that there are no errors, and once 
2. A’s resources are limited to k < M night patrols. 
3. B’s success requires a single crossing of the strait during the period of A? nights. 
4. Both A and B know the values of k and M. 
detected, B is caught. 
The first assumption is merely for simplification to limit the scope of the problem. As we point out 
later, relaxing this assumption requires only a slight extension. Implicitly, we are assuming that only 
light traffic exists in the channel, as one would expect for a channel that is being patrolled. Since A’s 
boats are much faster, once B is a sufficient distance from shore to be detected, he can neither cross 
nor return fast enough if, in fact, he is detected. We are also excluding from our consideration those 
boats belonging to side B that are crossing into A’s territory. Although the second assumption may 




2.1. One Patrol Boat - One Smuggler 
First, we shall consider the situation where each side has a single boat. Side B decides for each 
night to go or not to go and attempt escape across the channel, while A similarly makes a decision on 
whether or not to have a patrol in the channel. 
We shall denote by T ( n ,  k), k < M ,  n = M ,  M-1,  . . ., 1, the game determined by the above 





Go No go 
V I - ( n - l , k - l )  
Game over 
- 1  w - 1 ,  k) 
Game over 
Whenever side A assigns a patrol and B decides to attempt escape, side A has some probability of 
catching side B. This probability can be determined by solving a zero sum game [3]. If side B decides 
to go and A does not have a patrol out, then B wins the game and we assign to A, for convenience, 
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a payoff of - 1. Likewise, we let the ultimate payoff to A for capturing B be + 1. The remaining al- 
ternatives result in a loss of one available day, which is of benefit to side A .  If side A assigns 
a patrol and B does not go, then both sides face the game T ( n  - 1, k- 1) .  If A chooses not to assign a 
patrol while B elects not to go, then they face the game I‘(n - 1, k). 
Let g ( n ,  k) represent the value of the game T ( n ,  k ) .  It follows (from [6, p. 1731) that g ( n ,  k) is 
given by the recursive relationship 
v * g ( n - 1 ,  k ) + g ( n - 1 ,  k-1) 
v+g(n-1 ,  k + l ) - g ( n - 1 ,  k-1)  g ( n ,  k )  = 
with the boundary conditions g ( n ,  0) =- 1 and g ( n ,  n) = v, Vn > 0. We note that for the last period 
(n= 1) , the game matrix is 
where I v 1 < 1. By dominance, side B must choose the go strategy, which implies that he always elects 
to go in the last period if he has not attempted escape before. Now if side A has k= n available nights to 
assign patrols, then clearly he will use them all. Hence, the value of the game is v, since we know that 
B must go on one of these nights. If side A has k > n available nights for patrol, then with a single patrol 
boat, he can assign at most n of them. 
THEOREM 2.1: The solution to the difference equation (1) for the game I’(n, k), k < M ,  n= M ,  
M-1,  . . ., 1 is 
(3) 
PROOF: The proof follows directly by substituting (1) into (2) and simplifying. 
We can now apply this result to our game matrix to obtain 
k ( v + l )  - (n-1)  
n - 1  
The optimal mixed strategies for A and B can be determined from (3). Let xi be the probability that 
A will “assign a patrol” and y; the probability that B will “go” when n nights remain and A’s resources 
allow k patrols until the end of the period. It follows that the optimal choices for these probabilities 
are given by 
(44  x$= k/n,  ( k  < M ;  n = M ,  M -  1,  . . ., 1) 
(4b) yl,= l/n, ( k  < M; n = M ,  M -  1, . . ., 1 ) .  
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We conclude that in order to dbtain the value of the game, sideA must allocate his available nights 
that he can assign patrols such that his probability of assigning a patrol is equal to the ratio of the 
number of search periods available to him to the total number of remaining periods. For side B, a uni- 
form distribution over the remainder of the time period will provide him the value of the game. Note, 
in particular, that this probability, y:, does not depend on the number of available days that A has for 
assigning patrols. 
EXAMPLE: In order to demonstrate these results, consider the game r ( n ,  k) ,  whereby in any 
period if side A allocates a patrol when side B has elected to “go,” then A receives a payoff of 0.5. 
Suppose further that 10 nights remain until the end of the period, but A has only six nights available 
to him for assigning patrols. 
Thus, we have v=O.5, n= 10, and k = 6  for which we get from (4a) and (4b) thatxbo=0.6 and yko=O.l, 
and from (2) that the value of the game is $(lo, 6)=-0.1. Now if A did not “assign a patrol” and B 
did not “go,” thenA and B face the new game r ( 9 , 6 )  for which: 9~0.667, ~ ~ p 0 . 1 1 2 ,  andg*(9,6)=0. 
2.2. Two Patrol Boats-One Smuggler 
Unfortunately, we do not have such closed form results for situations where A and B have more 
than one boat. We shall, however, discuss formulations for deriving numerical solutions when A has 
two patrol boats. Let k l  < M and ke < M represent the number of patrols that can be assigned to these 
boats due to Iimited resources. There are two cases to be considered. 
Case 1 -Identical Patrol Boats 
Suppose the two patrol boats are identical and A can make assignments of patrols according to 
some optimal plan. Let V f  and V? be payoffs toA for assigning one and two patrols, respectively, on a 
given night when B chooses to “go”. Side A now has three alternatives, and the game matrix is of 
the form 
(5) 
[: r (n-1 ,  k-211 
T(n, k)  = r (n-1 ,  k-1) , 
-1 T(n-1, k) 
with the boundary conditions leading to 
noting that on the last day of the period 
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The fact that the two patrol boats are identical allows us to lump together the remaining available 
patrols for the period. The solution to this game can be derived through a recursive equation of the 
form 
from (5). This calls for the solution of a 3 X 2 game, which typically is solved by linear programing. We 
note that for this particular structure, the dual to the standard LP problem is 
min W 
s.t. VZ.y+g(n- l ,  k-2) . (1-y)  6 w 
Vfy+g(n- l ,  k - l ) - ( l - y )  6 w 
-y+g(n-1, k ) . ( l - y )  sw. 
In order to have dominance, it is necessary that E 2 VT 3 - 1 and g ( n -  1, k)  3 g ( n  - 1,  k -  1 )  
3 g ( n  - 1,  k - 2).  The LP given by (6) can conveniently be solved graphically. 
Case 2 -Nonidentical Patrol Boats 
Consider now the case where the two patrol boats are not identical. Let VF, V,*, and V$ represent 
the expected payoffs when boat number 1, boat number 2, and both boats, respectively, are assigned 
patrols according to some optimal allocation procedure. Denote by r ( n ,  kl, k z )  our game played when 
n periods remain and side A has k l  available patrols for patrol boat number 1 and kp for boat number 2. 
The game matrix then is 
(7) 
with the boundary conditions 
(V,”, if k l a l ,  k z a 1  
The solution to this game can be obtained numerically using the procedures described for Case 1. 
3. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
As with any model, the models presented here are mere abstractions of reality. Thus, the major 
gains provided are through insights from identifying and examining various relationships among 
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operational parameters. It is of interest in maintaining a patrol capability (side A )  to know what will 
happen if certain conditions are changed. In particular, one is concerned with how side A’s effectiveness 
and best strategy vary if he changes the number of patrol boats available for assignment to the strait. 
There are a host of extensions that could be made to the present study. In principle, the situation 
where side A has R > 2 patrol boats when B has one boat can be treated in a similar fashion as Case 2, 
i.e., with two nonidentical patrol boats, only the game matrix is 2R x 2. One must define all combinations 
of payoffs and numerically solve a recursive relationship for the value of the game. 
A much more difficult problem, but indeed one of interest, is the case where side B has more than 
one boat. Depending upon the payoffs involved, it might be more reasonable from B’s point of view to 
send out a number of boats, some of which are missioned to deceive or confuse A. From A’s viewpoint, 
this problem begins to take the form of a type of search and detection problem (see Pollock [4]). In the 
present study we assumed that side A had a constant detection capability and that perfect information 
was gained through detection. Although admittedly it is a more difficult problem computationally, 
conceptually one can extend these games to allow for false alarms. 
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